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Objective To express the views of a working party held to consider antibiotic resistance surveillance
systems, their strengths and weaknesses, and their current and future applications.
Methods The participants, all of whom were experienced in this ﬁeld, discussed the development of
surveillance systems in relation to the increasing prevalence of resistance to antibacterial agents and the
current interest in surveillance systems shown by many ofﬁcial bodies, in both the human and veterinary
ﬁelds. The problems inherent in surveillance systems were considered together with the applications of
different systems.
Results The properties of good antibiotic resistance surveillance systems were deﬁned. Surveillance
systems vary widely from those with a narrow base, focusing on few organisms in one disease area, to those
covering many diseases, many organisms (including normal ﬂora) and many compounds. Whatever
their design, they should be able to detect signiﬁcant differences and shifts in susceptibility to various
antibacterial agents, and the information derived from them should reach as many interested parties as
possible in a timely manner. In using this information to decide strategies, criteria for action need to be
determined by pragmatic consensus. Funding remains a major problem, with few large studies being
supported by ofﬁcial bodies in spite of their professed enthusiasm for surveillance. In consequence, many
current systems are funded by the pharmaceutical industry and are of necessity restricted in their focus.
Conclusions Antibiotic resistance surveillance studies should and can be well planned and well executed.
Many current systems suffer from well-recognized but uncorrected biases. Consortium funding will be
necessary for large schemes to be successful. There is no ‘ideal’ surveillance system.
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INTRODUCTION
Much has been written in recent years about the ever-increasing
problem of the numbers of clinically important bacteria that
have developed resistance to a wide range of antibacterial
agents. Articles with emotive titles abound, such as ‘Resistance
to antimicrobial drugs— a worldwide calamity’ [1], ‘Anti-
microbial resistance is a major threat to public health’ [2],
‘The microbial threat’ [3], ‘Drug resistance threatens to reverse
medical progress’ [4], and ‘Superbugs are beating at the gates’
[5]. Several groups have discussed, often at length, what can be
done [6–8]. Huovinen and Cars [9] suggest that ‘surveillance of
bacterial resistance is the key element to understanding the size
of the problem,’ and the report from the House of Lords Select
Committee on Resistance [10] states that ‘surveillance is vital to
the ﬁght against resistance.’ All these expressions of concern
have accepted implicitly that current antibiotic resistance sur-
veillance systems are an accurate and appropriate source of
information to drive interventions and measure the effects of
such interventions.
Many ofﬁcial bodies, such as the House of Lords Select
Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Lords
[10], the European Union (EU), the Federal Drug Authority
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(FDA) and the World Health Organization (WHO), have
expressed concern over the increase in drug resistance and have
called for more and better surveillance studies to be imple-
mented. As long ago as 1988, the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) in the USA published ‘Guidelines for the evaluation of
surveillance systems’ [11]. Also in the USA, a Task Force set up
by the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) in 1995
recommended that surveillance measures be implemented [12],
and in June 2000 the CDC ( jointly with the FDA and the
National Institute of Health) issued a Public Health Action Plan
to combat Antimicrobial Resistance [13]. In recent years,
various international surveillance studies, together with numer-
ous national initiatives, have been set up, with diverse aims and
structures, some in response to such exhortations. Some are
aimed speciﬁcally at certain disease areas, targeting, for example,
lower respiratory tract infections (LRTIs) (the Alexander
Project [14], established in 1992, the focus of which is com-
munity-acquired LRTIs), while others, such as the European
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (EARSS [15]),
the various gonococcal surveillance studies [16], and the
National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System
(NARMS) (Table 1) target individual or narrow groups of
organisms. SENTRY [17] and The Surveillance Network
(TSNTM ) [18] are examples of surveillance systems that test
a wide range of organisms.
The drugs tested in the various surveillance systems vary
widely, often depending on the funding body as well as the
organisms being sampled. Funding can be from industry (the
Alexander Project [14], MYSTIC [19], SPAR [20], and SEN-
TRY [17] (see Table 1 for details), from government sources
(EARSS [15], funded by the EU), or from commercial orga-
nizations (TSN, MRL [18]). EARSS [15] is a European net-
work of national surveillance systems funded by the DGVof the
European Commission, and coordinated by the National Insti-
tute of Public Health and the Environment in The Netherlands
(RIVM). The WHO has an increasing involvement and funds
several surveillance systems for speciﬁc organisms, including
those responsible for tuberculosis, anthrax, gonorrhea and
AIDS. The characteristics of a number of international surveil-
lance surveys have been described recently [21]. A European
Study Group on Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance
(ESGARS) was created after the WHO Workshop on ‘The
Current Status of Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance in
Europe’ [22]. Its aim is to investigate the diversity of techniques
used in resistance surveillance, review resistance data, and
provide expertise on analysis and interpretation of data so as
to enhance cooperation and to establish links between networks
of surveillance programs.
A well-planned surveillance study should provide data that
will monitor changes in susceptibility and the progress of
resistance and thus help in the control of resistance and in
the use of the most appropriate antibacterial agents. It has long
been recognized, and recently restated by Masterton [23], that
the mere accumulation of data is of little value in itself. If
surveillance studies are to fulﬁll their potential of helping to
control the spread of resistance, they have to be combined with
various other strategies.
The hospital Staphylococcus aureus pandemic of the 1950s and
1960s was probably the source of much of the current practice
of antibiotic resistance surveillance. It was not immediately
obvious at the time that samples were submitted to microbiol-
ogy laboratories with a greater frequency from patients infected
with resistant strains, and early calculations of resistance rates
produced what would now be regarded as inﬂated ﬁgures. It is
now the usual practice to exclude ‘duplicates’ or represent
‘multiple isolates’ by a single example in both numerator and
denominator in the calculation of resistance rates, although the
means by which this is achieved are diverse. The inclusion of all
isolates, however, was and remains necessary to those involved
in attempting to control the spread of individual strains in
hospital wards, and for the calculation of laboratory workload
and costs.
The hospital Staphylococcus also taught us the need to compare
‘like with like’ in the assessment of resistance rates from time
to time and place to place. Material with varying proportions
of diverse clinical samples and thus bacterial isolates from, say,
inpatients and outpatients yielded rates of resistance that for most
purposes could not be compared among different studies.
Unfortunately, published reports of resistance rates continue
either to ignore this problem or deal with it in different ways.
Thus, despite a considerable body of interest, surveillance
studies continue to be set up with scant regard for well-
recognized sources of inaccuracy, and for the purposes for
which they will be used. It was our objective to enumerate
and discuss sources of confusion, and encourage those who
conduct surveillance studies to ensure that their methods are
appropriate to their objectives.
METHODS
A group with expertise in clinical microbiology, infectious
diseases, epidemiology, statistics, antibiotic development, and
speciﬁcally in antibiotic resistance surveillance in these contexts,
met in April 2000 at Leeds Castle, Kent, UK to consider what
makes a good surveillance program, the needs for surveillance
programs, and the merits of those currently in use. Their views
were recorded and collated and this report was drafted.
RESULTS
What is surveillance?
Surveillance was deﬁned by the CDC [11] as the ongoing and
systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of data on
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Table 1 Some current surveillance studies
Surveillance study Funded by Organisms included Antibacterials Comments
Alexander Project [14] Smith Kline
Beecham
Key pathogens from
community-acquired
LTRI (Haemophilus influenzae,
Moraxella catarrhalis,
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Broad range of relevant
agentscurrently 22
Centralized testing. MICs.
Wide range of countries.
Web site.
DANMAPa Danish
government
Salmonella, Campylobacter,
Yersinia enterocolitica),
enterococci, Escherichia coli, etc.
Range of compounds Danish study. Samples
collected from humans,
animals and food. Some
MICs. Several centers
EARSSb EU Staphylococcus aureus and
Streptococcus pneumoniae
isolates from blood and
cerebrospinal fluid
Penicillins, cephalosporins,
ciprofloxacin, vancomycin
as appropriate
15 countries, 375 centers
MICs inmost centers
Total or sentinel coverage.
Web site
GISPc CDC Neisseria gonorrheae Penicillins, cephalosporins,
fluoroquinolones
24 sentinel cities in USA.
Web site
ICAREd CDC/NNIS Nosocomial organisms
Staphylococcus aureus,
Streptococcus pneumoniae,
Pseudomonas aeruginosa
and various Gram-negatives
Wide range of b-lactams,
fluoroquinolones,
vancomycin,
trimethoprim^sulfamethoxazole
NCCLS standards used
40 hospitals in US
participating in NNIS
scheme.Web site
MYSTICe Astra Zeneca Serious systemic
infectionsneutropenic,
cystic fibrosis, ICUs,
intra-abdominal
infections
Nine relevant compounds MICs and standard techniques
techniques, but not central
testing. Forty-six centers
worldwide
NARMSf FDA, CDC and
USDA
Zoonotic enteric
pathogens (Escherichia
coliO157:H7, Salmonella
and Campylobacter
species)
Up to17 compounds USA.Testing at CDC. MICs.
Clinical samples from
humans and animals. Also
from carcasses of
food-producing
animals.Web site
SMARTGlobal (Synercid) Rho“ ne Poulenc
Rorer (Aventis)
Staphylococcus aureus,
coagulase-negative
staphylococci,
Streptococcus pneumoniae,
Enterococcus faecium
6^13 relevant compounds 149 centers worldwide.
MICsstandardized
methods
SENTRY Bristol Myers,
Squibb
Wide range of organisms
fromwide range of
infections
Many compounds Centralized testing in three
regional laboratories.
MICs 70 centers in 30
countries. Somemolecular
techniques used
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disease, the results of which are disseminated to those who need
to know. Such data are used both to determine the need for
public-health actions and to assess the effects of any intervention
program. The WHO states that ‘surveillance of a communic-
able disease is fundamental for disease prevention and control’
[24]. Nothing needs to be added to the deﬁnition in the case of
antibiotic resistance surveillance.
‘Prevalence’ and ‘incidence’ are terms that are frequently
used interchangeably in respect of surveillance studies, but from
a statistical viewpoint they differ. When used in connection
with a disease, ‘prevalence’ refers to the number of cases in a
population at any given time point (i.e. it is a ‘snapshot’), and
‘incidence’ is the number of new cases over a speciﬁc time
period. In many antibiotic resistance surveillance studies, it is
prevalence rather than incidence that is determined, although
the terms ‘rates’ and ‘levels’ are often used, imprecisely, in
reporting resistance.
What are the problems and pitfalls?
Structure of study
The choice of organisms and drugs to be studied may be
complex. Clearly, it is neither practical nor economic to test
all available drugs against a large battery of organisms. Choices
have to be made, and these are often inﬂuenced by the funds
available and the organization carrying out the study. The
drugs selected need to be appropriate to the range of organ-
isms sampled or anticipated and/or the disease area, taking
account of commonly used drugs and those that provide
reference information or help to elucidate resistance mechan-
isms. In addition, the study may be local, national or interna-
tional. Surveillance may have a narrow focus or be more broadly
based, and each type has its place. The studies may be pre-
dominantly disease based or drug based, and, to be fully
effective, both approaches require the cooperation of various
bodies.
A disease-based study, e.g. on gonorrhea, anthrax or tuber-
culosis, needs cooperation between various healthcare organi-
zations, including hospitals, general practitioners, and
laboratory and clinical staff, ideally in various countries. If,
however, the study is to be based predominantly on a drug or
drug class, this involves cooperation between manufacturers of
both generic and proprietary drugs. There also needs to be
agreement regarding the disease area and organisms to be
sampled.
Selection of host populations to be sampled
If samples for microbiological analysis are collected for the sole
purpose of resistance surveillance, the host population can be
sampled adequately, but even under these conditions, the
introduction of bias is an inherent part of the sampling proce-
dure. In humanmedicine, however, sampling is usually based onTa
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bacteria isolated from samples submitted to clinical microbiol-
ogy laboratories for diagnostic purposes, and this can easily lead
to bias. Urinary tract infection is a context in which biases
introduced by this practice are clearly illustrated: many patients
do not visit a doctor if simple measures are effective in resolving
their symptoms, and if they do, the doctor often does not submit
samples, unless ﬁrst-line therapy fails. Such a practice results in
falsely high estimates of the prevalence of resistance [25]. The
frequency of collection of specimens is affected not only by the
disease, but also by other factors, such as the age of the patient,
with specimens being collected from elderly patients more often
than from younger patients [25,26]. Caution should also be
exercised in mixing samples from different populations, since
resistance rates may differ, as for example with pneumococci
from children who do or do not attend day-care centers [27].
Other biases include an apparent increase in resistance preva-
lence that may occur when isolates submitted to reference
laboratories comprise the denominator material.
It is essential that ‘like be compared with like’. For example, a
study should not compare undeﬁned mixtures of inpatients and
outpatients, or of patients and healthy carriers, or of patients in
different ranges of healthcare facilities. This becomes a major
problem when resistance rates for different hospitals are com-
pared. The problem becomes even more pronounced when
different countries are involved, and it is doubtful if, as currently
derived, national rates of resistance have any comparative value
at all. The meaning of comparisons of rates of resistance in
animal samples, food samples and human clinical or normal
ﬂora samples, as for example given in DANMAP [28], is only
superﬁcially easy to understand.
Choice of samplingmethods and organisms
The methods used for the isolation of resistant organisms will
have a great effect on their apparent prevalence. The least
sensitive methods, producing the lowest prevalence ﬁgures,
are the standard isolation and susceptibility testing procedures
used in diagnostic laboratories, while the most sensitive meth-
ods involve enrichment and selective culture of the original
specimen.
The choice of the isolates to be included is crucial to the value
of the results. First, isolates must be identiﬁed accurately at the
species level and, ideally, typed, so that mixtures of species and
types can either be deﬁned or avoided. One of the major
problems is that of multiple isolates from an individual patient
(which are difﬁcult to deﬁne in the absence of molecular
characterization of the bacterium and its resistance mechan-
isms), especially of resistant strains, as their inclusion in analyses
biases results towards an artiﬁcially high level of resistance.Many
different methods are used to avoid this problem, and the
introduction of computers into diagnostic laboratories has made
their application much easier in the context of human infection.
Most investigators identify isolates to species level, arbitrarily
deﬁne indistinguishable antibiograms, and on this basis deﬁne
multiple, presumably identical, isolates, excluding all but one
per patient from numerator and denominator. There is, how-
ever, a need for pragmatic consensus as to which of many
appropriate methods will actually be used if we are to compare
results from different communities. There are merits in taking
just the ﬁrst isolate of a particular strain from a patient, although
if subsequent isolates of that strain are resistant, this would not
be evident. The new NCCLS document M39 (currently in
preparation) on the subject of the testing of antimicrobial
susceptibility is likely to make a reasoned but essentially arbi-
trary choice as to whether the ﬁrst isolate or a subsequent one
should be selected [29].
Although it is generally agreed that an ‘adequate’ sample size
should be used, it is difﬁcult to determine what is ‘adequate’.
For some groups of organisms (e.g. pathogens in LRTIs) it is
relatively easy to accumulate a substantial number of isolates,
whereas for others this is not so. The greater the number of
centers involved in a study, the greater the chance of accumu-
lating a substantial number of isolates. With most studies, their
value increases with time as the numbers of samples increase. If
studies take too long, however, the prevalence of resistance may
well change, and if samples are pooled over time, temporal
trends may well be masked.
With food animals, although samples may be collected from
feces or carcasses of individual animals, this often occurs in
slaughterhouses or retail outlets after there has been consider-
able cross-contamination, so that prevalence of resistance in the
herd rather than that in the individual animal is deﬁned.
Surveillance of resistance in bacteria isolated from animals is
carried out in many countries with particular reference to
zoonotic organisms that may cause disease in humans, such
as salmonellae and Campylobacter [30]. Thus the UK, The
Netherlands and Germany, among others, have had such sur-
veys for a number of years. They have given useful data on the
changes over time, since standardized methods have been used
(at least within surveys such as the MAFF salmonella survey in
the UK). There are other studies on so-called ‘indicator’
organisms which might be transferred from animals to humans;
for example, Enterococcus faecium, a commensal in humans and
many animals, is the subject of a current study to determine
the prevalence of resistance to antibacterials used as growth
promoters [31].
Surveillance of animal pathogens with no connection to
human disease is less common, although carried out sporadi-
cally in most countries. This is often done for individual farms
or individual animals faced with an individual clinical problem.
Sadly, as with most human clinical data, results are seldom
retained and almost never collated regionally or nationally, and
so are wasted as a source of surveillance data. Isolates should
always be retained so that they are available subsequently for
comparison.
 2001 Copyright by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 7, 316–325
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Susceptibility testingmethodology
The method used for the testing of susceptibility is important.
There are numerous problems inherent in the various testing
procedures [32], and the best surveys are often those where a
standardized, internationally accepted technique is used to
determine susceptibility, with regular quality assurance being
incorporated into the system. If the techniques used by the
laboratories participating in surveillance studies are not stan-
dardized, then it is desirable to have the testing performed in
one center, as this avoids possible variability in techniques. A
number of systems, however, rely on information from many
centers using different methods. Two of the major surveillance
studies, The Alexander Project [14] and SENTRY [17], both
use central laboratories for testing and use standardized quanti-
tative techniques. All these requirements, however, militate
against the use of data routinely generated in very large amounts
by diagnostic laboratories. Provided that comparability of the
results obtained by different techniques in different laboratories
can be established, there are many advantages to the use of such
data, including its immediacy for clinical users of data. TSN [18]
uses just such data and has access to results from many labora-
tories in many countries. There is a particular problem of
diversity of methodology and interpretation in Europe, and
after careful consideration the European Committee on Anti-
biotic Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) has now proposed a
reference method for the determination of minimum inhibitory
concentrations (MICs), which it is hoped will be the basis of
ensuring comparability of results [33].
Quantitative data (i.e. MICs or zone diameters in disk
diffusion tests) are generally of more value than qualitative data
(interpretations as susceptible, intermediate or resistant), which,
for many drug–organism combinations, can indicate only very
broad trends and cannot show even major shifts in susceptibility
within each category. An example of an exception to this rule is
the use of genetic methods such as detection of mecA in
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. Increasingly, there is
a need for molecular techniques to be used to determine the
genetic basis of resistance. SENTRY [17] uses a battery of
molecular techniques on a range of species but this approach is
not common.
Handling and reporting of results
Statistical handling of surveillance data is difﬁcult. Many stan-
dard approaches to sampling human populations are not rele-
vant, because the target population in surveillance studies is
highly variable and not consistent. In general, it is not possible
to establish a ‘sampling frame’, and techniques used in ecology
might be more appropriate. Sampling methods for surveillance
studies are compared with those used for more conventional
surveys in Table 2.
It should be noted that the structure of data obtained from
surveillance programs will often be hierarchical: countries/
centers/hospitals/patients, etc. Furthermore, independence at
the lowest level, as is commonly assumed in most standard
statistical analyses, will not be ensured, clustering being a
phenomenon of infectious processes. Hence, simple compar-
isons of rates using (for example) chi-square tests will be invalid,
in that they will tend to overstate signiﬁcance. By the same
token, of course, if this simple technique fails to show any
signiﬁcant difference between samples, then it is reasonable to
assume that these differences can be explained by chance. The
converse will not necessarily hold.
It is essential that results are reported as rapidly as possible to as
wide an audience as is thought appropriate, including those
who submitted the basic data [11,23,32]. The growth of the use
of the Internet and the World Wide Web make this far more
achievable than previously. A number of current studies are
using the Web for the dissemination of their results; and
EARSS, the Gonococcal Isolate Surveillance Project (GISP)
and NARMS reports are all available on line (see Table 1 for
details). Several other studies have a Web site, some of which,
the Alexander project [14], for example, are valuable sources of
information, although the information on them may not always
be updated frequently. Earlier studies tended to rely upon yearly
reports, presentations at international symposia and publica-
tions in peer-review journals, all of which are relatively slow
processes.
Input from information technology experts now becomes an
essential part of any surveillance program. TSN has accumu-
lated information on a database from which analyses can be
made [18,34,35]. The WHONET program [36] is designed
speciﬁcally for the analysis of data from a range of laboratories.
Funding
It is clear that whether narrowly focused or broadly based,
surveillance studies involve a great deal of work and consider-
able cost. The ASM set up a Task Force (TFAR) in 1995 as a
response to the emergent resistance problem. TFAR acknowl-
edged that surveillance systems were needed, and its conclusions
were that: networks are needed immediately— local, national
and global; human and animal pathogens should be monitored;
appropriate data-based intervention would then be possible.
Table2 Comparison of sampling methods used for conventional medical
studies and for surveillance studies
Conventional
human sampling studies
Surveillance
studies
Fixed population Dynamic population
Sampling frame No sampling frame
Members known Members unknown
Probability sampling possible
simple, stratified etc.
Probability sampling not possible
Can be retrospective Must be prospective
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The Task Force listed a number of features that would be part
of a surveillance scheme, but, unfortunately, no such scheme
was instituted, since consortium funding was needed— from
government, industry and professional organizations—and this
was not forthcoming. Jones [37], in commenting on this
lamentable situation, has suggested that the spirit of cooperation
and trust needed to deal with this problem appeared to be
lacking. Some smaller-scale studies have been funded: the Inten-
sive Care Antimicrobial Resistance Epidemiology (ICARE),
for example, is a surveillance system funded by the CDC,
concentrating on intensive care hospitals participating in the
National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance System (NNIS
[38]). NARMS is funded jointly by the FDA, CDC and USDA.
The EU is funding some surveillance programs in conjunction
with the governments of various countries, an example being
EARSS [15]. The WHO is funding a number of surveillance
studies, many targeted at speciﬁc organisms, such as those
responsible for tuberculosis and gonorrhea (Gonococcal Anti-
microbial Surveillance Programme; GASP [39]).
Increasingly, pharmaceutical companies are performing their
own postmarketing surveillance studies to monitor any devel-
opment of resistance to a new agent: SPAR (sparﬂoxacin [20]),
SMART (Synercid), MYSTIC (meropenem [19]) and ZAP
(linezolid) are examples (see Table 1). These studies tend to
concentrate on the disease area for which their compound will
have the greatest use. Most of these studies have to run for at
least 3 years to allow an assessment of any changes in suscept-
ibility to the new agent. It seems likely that the requirements of
the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) [40] for
the initial and continued registration of antibiotics will exert
more pressure on pharmaceutical companies to conduct such
studies, although it is far from clear who will have responsibility
for generic as opposed to proprietary products.
Table 1 lists the main features of some of the major surveil-
lance systems, including those funded by industry, in addition to
those noted above.
What is the purpose of surveillance?
The main purpose of surveillance is to detect shifts in suscept-
ibility of various organisms to various antibacterial agents and to
inform prescribers and other interested parties of such changes
as soon as possible. If an increase in resistance is noted in any
species, information from surveillance studies can help direct
appropriate therapy to treat emerging resistant pathogens and to
allow strategies to be formulated aimed at reducing or prevent-
ing any further development of resistance. In addition, the
impact of current strategies on resistance and/or its develop-
ment could be assessed. Strategies might include formulary
changes, the development of policy guidelines, whether local,
national or international, and changes in prescribing practices
and infection control. It is to be hoped that good comparative
clinical trials of interventions, noted so far for their absence, will
be devised. There are reports of a few such interventions, most
notably in Finland, where an alarming increase in the resistance
to erythromycin among isolates of group A streptococci led to
changes in the policy for the prescribing of antimicrobials,
especially to children. In the years following these changes, a
marked decrease in resistance to erythromycin was seen,
although it still remained at a signiﬁcant level [41]. In Sweden,
clinicians were urged to reduce the prescribing of macrolides
and penicillins to children in response to a rise in the incidence
of resistance among pneumococci. Prescribing of these agents
did fall, and the initial report following this reduction in
prescribing indicated that the rate of resistance had not
increased, but it is not clear whether resistance has fallen
subsequently or remained static [42].
An additional and important function of surveillance is that of
education, fulﬁlling a need to knowmore about the mechanism
of the transmission of resistant clones, their persistence in the
population and the resistance mechanisms involved. The occur-
rence and spread of multiresistant strains need to be monitored,
as infections caused by such strains can be particularly difﬁcult to
treat. Since much unnecessary or inappropriate prescribing of
antibacterial agents, especially for respiratory tract infections, is
as a result of pressure from outpatients, the dissemination of
information from surveillance studies can help in educating the
public with regard to the appropriate use of these drugs.
Improved information on resistance patterns locally can help
physicians in appropriate empirical prescribing, necessary for
many community infections and some hospital infections.
Ideally, unique events, such as a novel mode of resistance or
resistance in a previously highly susceptible species, may be
detectable if the study is designed to show this. For example, a
surveillance study can result in the early detection of novel
modes of resistance, especially if interpretive reading of resis-
tance patterns and molecular techniques are used. Few current
studies are so designed, most concentrating on species for
which there is a known problem (e.g. certain Gram-negative
species,Streptococcus pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus, enterococci,
gonococci, Mycobacterium tuberculosis). The larger surveillance
studies can play an important role in identifying some emerging
resistance patterns, since they have access to a major database
[35,43].
Who are surveillance studies for?
The ‘customers’ or ‘users’ of the data generated from surveil-
lance studies include prescribers and clinicians, microbiologists
in academic, diagnostic and reference laboratories, infection
control practitioners, those who produce drug formularies,
purchasers of health care, regulatory authorities (both national
and international), public-health authorities, pharmaceutical
companies, and, ﬁnally, and increasingly, the public and poli-
ticians on their behalf.
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The data obtained in surveillance studies need to be relevant
to the intended customer or user [44]. The requirements of the
various users are not necessarily the same, although all need
bias-free resistance rates based on individual patient isolates
from deﬁned populations that can be compared legitimately,
but this position is far from being achieved. The interests of the
pharmaceutical industry are broadly similar to those of reg-
ulatory authorities, as they will use broad-range surveillance
data for regulatory purposes and for marketing. Other users,
such as prescribers and clinicians, often have different require-
ments. They will need national, regional or even local infor-
mation, including data on speciﬁc organisms (see below).
Infection control specialists will require information from
repeat cultures.
Global, national or local?
Global surveillance is necessary, since resistance genes are able
to cross national and international boundaries, sometimes
rapidly. The spread of drug-resistant tuberculosis and penicil-
lin-resistant pneumococci are examples of this global transmis-
sion. Local surveillance data are, however, the most important
for the clinician needing guidance for empirical therapy and in
the management of resistance problems [26]. An individual
hospital may have a different problem from a hospital only a few
miles away. Local and regional data can provide the basis for
national and international surveillance [9,45]. There are pro-
blems, however, in pooling information obtained locally or
regionally to produce overall national or global resistance rates
when the local resistance rate is highly variable [35,44]. Exam-
ples have been published of such variations in penicillin resis-
tance in pneumococci in the UK by Wise and Andrews [44]
and in ciproﬂoxacin resistance in Escherichia coli in the USA by
Sahm et al [35]. Sahm et al showed that in various institutions in
a US state, ciproﬂoxacin resistance among Escherichia coli ranged
from 0% to 18.2%, with a mean of 6.2%. The variation of
resistance between states within a geographic region was from
0.4% to 6.2%, and the overall national ﬁgure was 1.6%. Wise
and Andrews found a range of 0–30.8% for high-level penicillin
resistance among pneumococci isolated in various UK hospi-
tals. Clearly, under such circumstances, the overall or national
rates have little relevance and can be highly misleading, even
when biases have been avoided. Such variations can be caused
by the spread of a resistant clone or by bias in the types of
specimens submitted for testing and other factors already
outlined.
The importance of some diseases, especially tuberculosis and
gonorrhea, has resulted in a number of surveillance studies at
varying levels, local, national and international. Resistance in
gonococcal isolates, for example, has been the focus of a local
study in London, UK [46], a newly instituted national study in
the UK (Gonococcal Resistance to Antimicrobials Surveillance
Programme; GRASP [16]), a regional/national survey in a
number of major cities in the USA (GISP, Table 1), and an
international study by theWHO in theWestern Paciﬁc Region
(GASP [39]). The results of such diverse studies fulﬁll valuable
but different functions.
Are surveillance studies achieving their goals?
A problem evident in surveillance work is that there is no
‘correct’ answer to many of the questions posed on prevalence
or incidence, and interpretation of the data will require prag-
matic consensus on a hitherto unprecedented scale. This is a
problem at its most acute in the context of the calculation of
national resistance rates: for example, the EMEA has required
that these rates should be used to assess the continuing validity of
individual antibiotic registration for clinical use in the EU. As
yet, no-one has even suggested how such rates might be
determined for the purpose, yet it is clear that unless sufﬁcient
representative numbers of isolates and identical populations of
patients are studied over time and in each country, comparison
of results will be invalid. Further deﬁnitions of the purpose and
interpretation of data for regulatory purposes are required.
Much has been written about how the results from good
studies can help in the control of the spread of resistance and in
policy-making to ensure that antibacterials are used appropri-
ately [23,26,45]. It is difﬁcult, as yet, to see a direct link between
results from surveillance studies and policy-making. Some
attempts are being made to forge such links; the European
Study Group on Antibiotic Policies (ESGAP) was instituted in
1999 with the intention of investigating how control measures
could be instituted, but it is too early to see whether this group
will have a role to play.
Sadly, one attempt has not been encouraging; the study on
the prevalence of resistance in Enterococcus faecium in animals
(noted above) was instigated by the EU, funded by the animal
health industry and carried out in six EU countries with the
assistance of the member states involved. The study was
intended to help in decision-making regarding the future of
antibacterials used as growth promoters for farm animals. In the
event, however, a seemingly arbitrary decision was taken to
remove four compounds from the market under the ‘precau-
tionary principle’ in 1998 without waiting for the result of the
survey.
If surveillance studies are to fulﬁll their potential, an essential
part of the process will be the selection of thresholds or triggers
for action.When results indicate an increase in, or a high level of
resistance— is intervention required, what form should this
take, at what level of resistance should this be instigated, and
who will make these crucial decisions? The problem was ably
summarized by Harrison and Lederberg [47]: ‘Despite the most
carefully conceived, proactive and effective effort, some level of
resistance is inevitable; the challenge will be to achieve con-
sensus beforehand about what level(s) of resistance will warrant
intervention.’
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CONCLUSIONS
Surveillance studies are essential to detect and monitor the
development of resistance to antibacterial agents, but for the
results to be of value the information gathered must be based on
sound studies and be unbiased, and results must be distributed
rapidly to those best able to use the data. Decisions need to be
made regarding the deﬁnition of critical populations to be
monitored for both local and international comparisons of
resistance rates; what level of resistance warrants intervention,
and the nature of that intervention. Quantitative data are of
more value than qualitative data, and all testing must be shown
to yield results that are capable of valid comparison. Molecular
techniques should be used to deﬁne strains and to detect
different mechanisms of resistance. There is a place for both
narrow-focus and broader surveillance studies: both require
funding, but the broader studies, including a wide range of
organisms and compounds, require consortium funding, which
has not hitherto been forthcoming.
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